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iologique Internationale (RAI) in Geneva and Bern on 22–26 June 2015. I 
would like to thank the organizers of the Rencontre for accepting my appli-
cation for the workshop, foremost Mirko Novák and Sabine Ecklin, for 
their encouragement and help.  
Most of the articles in this volume are expanded and revised versions of 
papers presented at the morning panel during the workshop “Visualizing 
Emotions and Senses in the Ancient Near East”, which I organized to-
gether with Ainsley Hawthorn (Yale University) and Anne-Caroline Rendu 
Loisel (University of Geneva). An unpublished article by Othmar Keel, 
which he wrote in the 1990s, has been added to the volume. Wolfgang 
Zwickel, who was also present at the workshop, agreed to revise and reprint 
an earlier published article of his own. Karen Sonik accepted my invitation 
to contribute her thoughts on the subject of emotion in Mesopotamian art, 
while John Baines in his epilogue comments on the volume from the per-
spective of Egyptian art. I am very grateful to all the authors for their huge 
effort. 
I would also like to offer my thanks to all contributors to the workshop 
for their constructive and well-focused presentations and to everyone for 
participating and further stimulating the discussion during and after the 
Rencontre, especially to Irene Winter. It was a very fruitful interdiscipli-
nary conversation and I am excited to present some of its most important 
results in this volume. 
The workshop at the Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale was fi-
nanced by the Promotion Fund for Early Career Researchers at the Univer-
sity of Bern (Nachwuchsförderungs-Projektpool der Mittelbauvereinigung 
der Universität Bern). The Berne University Research Foundation and the 
Reformed Churches of the Cantons Bern-Jura-Solothurn funded the print-
ing costs for the volume. 
As editor of this volume, I am especially grateful to Christoph Ueh-
linger, senior editor of the series Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis, not only for 
accepting this volume for publication in this series and for his help 
throughout the editing process, but also for his many supportive sugges-
tions and his expertise in improving the text. I would also like to sincerely 
thank Andreas Wagner, who encouraged and enabled me to organize the 
workshop during my time as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of 
Bern on the Swiss National Science Foundation-funded research project on 
“Emotions in the Old Testament”. 
VIII AUTOR 
And last but not least I am very grateful to Marshall Cunningham, who 
helped me in the editing of the English articles. 
Sara Kipfer, Heidelberg / Bern 2017 
The Discourse on Emotion in Ancient Mesopotamia: 
A Theoretical Approach1 
Margaret JAQUES 
1. Introduction 
The study of the expression of emotion in ancient Mesopotamia is subject 
to the boundaries implied by a language and a culture that disappeared two 
thousand years ago. For lack of an anthropological approach to the Sumeri-
ans and the Akkadians themselves, we have to concentrate on its epiphe-
nomena, which are the texts in which they expressed these emotions. 
Through the numerous documents that the Sumerians and Akkadians left 
us, is it possible to understand and analyse their emotions, not as psycholo-
gists or anthropologists, but as historians? While this question may at first 
sight seem surprising, its stake is part of a broader contemporary research 
context.2 
We must first answer a methodological question: How is it possible to 
study emotions in ancient history? And how can we understand a subjective 
vocabulary in two extinct languages written on old, often broken, clay tab-
lets? Lacking cuneiform treatises concerned with emotion words and in the 
absence of modern global studies on the subject, we are left to gather as 
much as possible from miscellaneous words in a multiplicity of documents. 
Those words, we think, are likely to designate emotions that reflect the 
contexts in which they appear. The methodological questions are very 
pragmatical: Do particular emotions occur in good or bad situations? 
Which narrative character expresses which emotion, in what period and in 
what context? What reaction does the expression of an emotion provoke?  
                                                     
1  This article is based on my doctoral dissertation on Sumerian vocabulary of emotion 
(Jaques 2006). Sumerian words are transliterated in normal script (ki áĝ); Akkadian 
words are written in italic (râmu); "=" (in Asum. = Bakk.) should be understood as “be-
longing to the same semantic field of” or “is parallel with” rather than “signifies” or “is 
equivalent to”. Concepts of emotion with elements of meaning are indicated between 
straight quotation marks ("joy"). For English corrections, I thank Emmert Clevenstine.  
2  I have in mind here the new subfield of history known as “emotionology” and the histo-
ry of American religions. In France, one of the first to research in this domain was Fevbre, 
“La sensibilité et l’histoire: Comment reconstituer la vie affective d’autrefois” (1941: 5-
20). For ancient Mesopotamia, Oppenheim (1967) argued in his chapter “Can these 
bones live?” that in order to penetrate beneath the surface of the texts, we must search 
for “immediateness”, that is, the perception of “both the unusual and the atypical diction 
and the echoes and allusions”. Fevbre and Oppenheim each in their own way wanted to 
attempt a kind of “virtual fieldwork” as in anthropology. 
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Under these conditions, a delimitation of the field of investigation on the 
basis of our own emotional experience would only distort things by impos-
ing artificial criteria on the text. To look elsewhere, in another, completely 
different cultural environment or historical era, for similar features of what 
the discourse on emotions was in Mesopotamia, would end up not only at a 
dead-end but also at totally erroneous notions. Other approaches to emotion 
research, whether philosophical, religious, psychological, ethnological, 
historical or linguistic, are not however without interest for our study. His-
torical and ethnological analyses allow us first to set down some principles 
such as the distinction between the emotions and the (meta-)language used 
to describe emotion.3 Indeed, when an emotion appears at a given time, for 
example in Old Babylonian texts, we must ask ourselves what appears ex-
actly, whether it is a new sensitivity or a new rhetoric. The only thing that 
we are sure of is that specific language expressing a certain type of emotion 
has appeared. But this does not prove of course that this emotion was not 
felt before.  
Alain Corbin, a specialist in the study of 19th-century French thought, 
sets forth three reasons why an emotion may remain “non-said” (non-dit) in 
a given language: it is not-said because it is overly perceived (like the noise 
of cars in the street today), it is not-said because it is impossible to say (the 
word to express it does not exist) or because it is not the tradition to say it 
(for example, an emotional response to nature in an non-industrial society), 
and it is not said because it is forbidden to say it. To name an emotion is 
thus not a natural process, but an artificial creation, a cultural fact.4 To each 
culture, to each society belongs a specific vocabulary expressing a certain 
number of emotions, according to a more or less broad or a more or less 
precise perspective. In the absence of all discourse about emotion by the 
Sumerians and the Akkadians themselves, it would be difficult to interpret 
why such an emotion does not appear in their writings or why a particular 
                                                     
3  Larsen (2001: 278) distinguishes between a “discourse on emotion” and an “emotional 
discourse”. Bamberg (1997: 309) develops these two research angles. An emotional dis-
course is for him a two-fold form of discourse: a linguistic and an extralinguistic one 
(facial expression, body posture, proximity, etc.). In this view, “language and emotion 
are two concurrent, parallel systems in use, and their relationship exists in that one sys-
tem (emotion) impacts on the performance of the other (language)”. On the other hand, a 
discourse on emotion starts from the assumption that language “reflects” objects in the 
world, among them the emotions: “Language have emotion terms, and people across the 
world engage in talk about the emotions”. In this other view, “Language is a means of 
making sense of emotions”. As objects of study, it is important to distinguish between 
the study of emotions as the object of phenomenology, theology or psychology and the 
study of the discourse on emotion as the object of history and of linguistic and cultural 
anthropology. These different approaches are of course not exclusive. 
4  Lutz (1988: 209) concludes with the remark that “emotion experience (...) is more aptly 
viewed as the outcome of social relations and their corollary worldviews than as univer-
sal psychobiological entities”. We find a similar remark in Grima (1992: 6): “Emotion is 
culture.” 
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emotion is mentioned more often in reference to the relationship between 
man and god than to that between man and woman. It is, however, im-
portant to take note of these phenomena and to draw a chart as complete as 
possible of the emotions expressed and surely lived by the people of Meso-
potamia. 
The material for this study has been collected from three types of texts: 
lexical lists, royal inscriptions, and “literary” texts. The word “literary” 
must be taken in a broad sense, as it includes narrative documents as well 
as poetical texts, omens, and letters. These three types of sources do not 
have the same structure or the same goals, and the information that we ob-
tain from them is varied and complementary. The case of the lexical lists is 
special because the terms are “without context”, as would be the entries of 
a glossary without commentary. They enumerate Sumerian or Akkadian 
words, give written forms, and in bilingual lists add Akkadian, sometimes 
Hittite, translations. Their contents are gathered under a common denomi-
nator such as first names, professional names, names of objects in wood or 
of animals. The absence of a heading “emotion” poses straightaway the 
difficulty of classifying words gathered and interpreted today as “emotion 
words” of ancient cultures. For the ancient people of Mesopotamia, emo-
tions did not belong to an overarching class of psychological or cultural 
experience, but were distinct notions, apparently without any link between 
them. To pose a type "emotion" is a theoretical artifice allowing modern 
research to take place. It cannot, however, presuppose the reality of such a 
type in ancient Mesopotamia. 
There is a multiplicity of emotion words in Sumerian and Akkadian that 
scholars render with the help of conventional ad hoc translations, even if 
they are aware that the concepts of that time do not correspond to the mod-
ern equivalents. Even in modern languages, when we look at the stock of 
emotion words in a given language, often we do not find exactly corre-
sponding words in other languages: to appreciate this, it is enough to com-
pare the German word "Glück" with the English word "happiness".5 
Before one risks a definition or a classification of this vocabulary, a 
study on and around the signification of each word must also be performed. 
The first source of information on the meaning, and by far the most reliable 
one, is the immediate literary context. This implies that language is the 
obligatory way to access historical knowledge. The first step in any re-
search is to decipher and understand the texts we have at hand. In a second 
step, one can make semantic comparisons between Akkadian translations of 
Sumerian material and other Semitic languages. The Akkadian translations, 
which come either from the lexical lists or from bilingual texts, although 
contemporary with the Sumerian speakers, cannot serve as the unique basis 
                                                     
5  For the same observation concerning the English word "anger", see Harkins/Wierzbicka 
(2001: 3ff.). 
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for the attribution of meaning, because these translations are not philologi-
cal in nature, and their purpose was not to produce exact semantic equiva-
lents, but more of adequations. One can also look in other directions: 
through the study of etymology when it is possible, and on the base of 
one’s own common sense. Indeed, these steps do not produce proofs, as is 
so often the case in the study of ancient cultures, but rather highlight 
tendencies that make a researcher incline toward one manner of under-
standing rather than toward another one. These first tools provide a neces-
sary preliminary framework into which successive elements of research can 
be woven.6 
2. Classification of the Vocabulary of Emotion 
If emotions are indeed cultural, they are not invariable.7 They are a socially 
validated judgement from individuals rather than an innate category. There-
fore research has to focus on emotion words and on the domains of mean-
ing expressed by the texts associated with them. Study of the discourse on 
emotion has to concentrate on the norms of expression, which may appear 
radically different to the outside observer.  
The expression of emotions in ancient Mesopotamia can be classified 
into broad categories. In a very schematic manner and by basing oneself on 
the corpus mentioned before, we can differentiate the material into “con-
ventional expression” and “non-conventional expression”. In conventional 
discourse, an identical and recurring expression can be compared and in-
scribed in a chart almost out of context. This is the case, for example, for 
                                                     
6  Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) as a tool for cross-cultural analysis of emotion 
words is a theory developed by Wierzbicka (see Harkins/Wierzbicka 2001: 8-16). Emo-
tion words are “complex (decomposable) and culture-specific” concepts which cannot 
simply be translated into another language. To understand emotion words, “experts” 
need to understand the explanations of ordinary people. For that they have to share a 
common language made of “simple and universal words” like “good”/“bad”, “think”, 
“people”, “I”, “you” etc.  
 This tool is likely to function in fieldwork, but it meets difficulties in historical research: 
In ancient cultures, texts do not reveal all “statements of meanings” because the histo-
rian cannot reach all the layers of a society. For Pongratz-Leisten (2001: 196) “historical 
research has to be aware that the city-oriented language power creates its own dimension 
of meaning and conceives of city life as inherently superior to life in the countryside and 
in the steppe”. Also Larsen (2001: 283) “we must (...) realise that such statements reach 
us through layers of conventions and social and linguistic norms”. It is clear that in his 
research, the historian meets not historical facts but rather the conception of the world 
expressed by urban literate elite.  
7  For a review of the radical opposition between different points of view that lead to 
different theories, see the chapter “Tensions in the study of emotion” in Lutz/White 
1986: 406ff. Lutz also explains these theories in the chapter “Emotion, thought, and es-
trangement: Western discourses on feeling” (1988: 53-80). 
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the repetitive material of the royal inscriptions that are not intended to con-
vey real emotions but rather appropriate, formal expressions of feelings on 
specific occasions. In a non-conventional expression, on the other hand, 
each relationship has an interest and an importance in itself. It is appro-
priate to distinguish in these expressions between the more realistic ones 
and the more idealistic versions. The main difficulty is in fact inherent in 
the topic of the research itself precisely because emotions are cultural auto-
matisms, that is, they need not be commented on. Acquired conventions, 
norms, and habits dictate what emotion can be shown to whom and in 
which contexts. Sometimes we can find no reason for emotion. Daily life 
very largely escapes the written sources, yet emotions were lived daily by 
the ancient people of Mesopotamia. 
On the chart of words for emotions, it appears that certain terms are 
used very often, others more seldom, and some very rarely. We see an ana-
lytical frame organising itself, with on one side an abundance of data, meta-
phorical images, and descriptions, and on the other side a surprising pov-
erty of elements. One has to be aware not to fall into the trap of the “said” 
and “non-said” as mentioned by Corbin (2000), but must also be able to 
identify the norms that order their differences and to observe their modula-
tions in the documents. Different factors – for example the literary corpus 
in which a vocabulary is attested first, but also perhaps historical, religious, 
or moral aspects – can have influenced their representation systems, their 
differences, and their permanencies. Armed with these methodological 
observations, one can concentrate on the lexical question and distinguish 
eleven categories of emotion in Mesopotamia: The vocabulary of "joy", 
"anger", "love", "hate", "sadness", "fear", and different statements for 
"trouble", "compassion" and one word for "jealousy". 
Besides surmounting the difficulties of translation, it is also necessary to 
focus on the manner in which this terminology would have behaved in con-
text: Is it employed in epithets? With which agent or subject? To these two 
questions, we should add the separate study of what we might call the 
words or expressions used in closely related senses that do not belong to 
the vocabulary of emotion, like "darkness" or "twisted", which appear in 
similar contexts. 
This approach makes it possible to identify constant features. When we 
speak in terms of emotion, this implies either an isolated subject or the 
perception by an agent of a given reality. In other words, the emotion is a 
moral, aesthetic, or legal judgement about reality or a personal quality or 
shortcoming. This distinction is important as, confronted with the question 
“why is such a god, such a hero, or such a man happy?” we have the 
choice, following the grammatical construction of the sentence, between an 
incidental cause (“he is happy because of such a thing, such an event, or 
such ritual”) or a permanent nature (“he has a happy, good, optimistic na-
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ture”). This distinction can have historical or religious premises. It may also 
have historical and religious consequences. 
On the other hand, it appears during the textual analysis that the con-
texts are either individual and internal, or collective, external and ritual. 
This observation has implications that are not as simple as they may seem. 
It means that ancient Mesopotamian emotions can be seen either as a psy-
chological impression of an affect or as the expression of a social and reli-
gious norm. The latter applies in particular to terminology for joy and sad-
ness. Gary Anderson, in a book with the evocative title A Time to Cry, a 
Time to Dance (1995), studied this problematic in the Jewish religion: the 
word śimḫa "joy" can be used in the same contexts and occurrences as 
modern European terms, but like the words for "love" and "honour" in the 
Hebrew Bible, śimḫa also appears in legal texts. "Joy" can thus be pre-
scribed on certain occasions, such as sacrificial feasting or the performance 
of psalms. The rites expressing "joy" stand in precise opposition to rites of 
"mourning". 
"Joy" "Mourning" 
Eating and drinking Fasting 
Praise of God Lamentation 
Anointing with oil Putting ashes or dust on one’s head 
Festal garments Sackcloth or torn clothes 
2.1. Need, demand and the positive relationship to others: the emotions of 
"joy", "love" and "compassion" 
Observing the varieties of the data gives us the opportunity to reflect on the 
elements of continuity and rupture inside the expression of need, demand 
and positive relationship with others. "Joy" is the most representative emo-
tion in the general corpus, probably because most of the texts we possess 
have a hymnal character. To express it, the Sumerians had no fewer than 
four verbs and three substantives, corresponding to twice as many Akka-
dian equivalents (verbs and their derivatives, or idiomatic clauses). Such 
richness can be explained by the patchwork of expressions describing "joy" 
in different situations: individual or communal, isolated or relational. The 
Sumerian word ḫul2 and the Akkadian equivalent ḫadû are the terminus 
technicus for "joy" meaning in the most general manner “to be happy, to 
rejoice”. The other words express as many emotions as situations: The Su-
merian composed verb, ul te(.ĝ), for example, refers to a joy linked with 
drunkenness and euphoria: “The gods Enki (and) Ninmaḫ drink beer, their 
heart become elated (ul te(.ĝ)”8. It may also have sexual connotations: “The 
                                                     
8  Enki et Ninmaḫ Sect. II 15: dEn-ki-ke4 dNin-maḫ-e kaš im-na8-na8-ne ša3-bi ul mu-un-te. 
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god Enki became elated (ul te(.ĝ) (at the sight) of the goddess Uttu; lying in 
her crotch, he clasped her to the bosom”9. On the other hand, the composed 
verb ša3 dug3 which, according to its etymology, is a quality (dug3 “good”) 
of the heart (ša3), is used more to show the satisfaction, especially in a ju-
ridical context, for example after a debt has been repaid,10 but also for con-
tentment and well-being in general.  
There are specific collective occasions where the use of words of "joy" 
is common, the most important one being religious and royal festivities. 
The festival day is itself metaphorically called in Akkadian “day of joy” 
(ūm ḫidûtu) or “play, entertainment” (mēlultu). The texts give the principal 
aspects of festive rejoicing: banquets, prayers and praises, familial life, 
sexual relationships, music, etc. These positive aspects appear in the coun-
sels of Siduri, the ale-wife, to Gilgameš who is seeking eternal life after the 
death of his companion Enkidu.11 
Humor is attested principally in late Babylonian literature, but through-
out Sumerian and Akkadian texts we find proverbs, jokes, and word plays, 
whose goal is to make readers laugh. Humor of this sort was originally the 
creation of students, and it belonged to the school curriculum, especially 
when in the form of debates between two partners such as the Hoe and the 
Plough, the Bird and the Fish, or the Grain and the Sheep. 
"Joy" is the sign of a good and healthy relationship with gods. This 
“normal order of things” is expressed in Sumerian by the expression “to 
look on someone with a joyful eye” (igi ḫul2 bar) or “to have a luminous 
forehead” (saĝ-ki zalag). This joy, which has the magical power to heal the 
sick person, always comes from the gods’ side and is often linked to the act 
of determining a good fate: “The god An threw him (= the king) a joyful 
eye (igi ḫul2) (and) determined for him a good fate.”12 
"Love", expressed by the Sumerian ki aĝ2 (= râmu in Akkadian), is one 
of the substantives most used in the literature of all periods. The etymology 
of the Sumerian word ki aĝ2 is controversial: until recently ki was con-
sidered to mean “earth” and aĝ2 to be the verb “to measure”, so that “to 
love” would etymologically mean “to measure a piece of land”! New re-
search, especially on the written form of the word ki, have shown that in 
this case it cannot signify “earth”13. The Akkadian word râmu corresponds 
                                                     
9  Enki et Ninḫursaĝa 179-180: dEn-ki-ke4 dUttu-ra ul im-m[a]-ni-in-t[i] gaba šu im-mi-in-
dab ur2-ra-[n]a nu2-a. 
10  Muffs 1975. 
11  For the well-known discourse of Siduri to Gilgameš, see George 2003: 278-279. Tigay 
(1982: 167ff.) qualifies these recommendations as carpe diem in a chapter on “Tradi-
tional Speech Forms”. For an analysis of this passage, see Abusch 1993a: 1-14; id. 
1993b: 3-17; id. 1993c: 53-62. 
12  Hymn to Ninšubur and her city(?) A-akkil rev. 3: An-ne2 igi ḫul2-la mu-ši-in-bar nam 
dug3 mu-ši-i[n-tar] (cf. Sjöberg 1982: 72 no.4). 
13  ki “earth” has a final -0 (ki+locative = ki-‘a), whereas ki in ki aĝ2 is syllabically written: 
ki-ig, ki-ga and ki-in. 
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to the Arabic word ra’ima.14 "Love" in ancient Mesopotamia is used pri-
marily in religious contexts. To give "love" to humans is a privilege of 
gods. It is the expression of an agreement in a political and juridical con-
tractual relationship between a god and another god of lower standing or a 
human being, for example the king Šulgi: “Šulgi, (the beloved of her 
heart =) the favorite one of the goddess Ninlil.”15 
A change in this conception of the hierarchy can be observed in the royal 
hymns of Šulgi. During the third dynasty of Ur the kings were divinized. 
The name Šulgi was written from around his 10th year of reign onward with 
the determinative diĝir “god”. The kings stood on an equal level with the 
gods and they could both "love" (like a god) and "be loved" (like a king or 
a human being). This different relationship appears also in the use of the 
derivative participle ki aĝ2-(ĝa2) (= narāmu) in epithets for gods and for 
kings.  
The symmetrical opposite word for ki aĝ2 "love" is ḫul gig "to hate". ki 
aĝ2 and ḫul gig often appear in opposition in declarations of value or in 
moral judgement, for example in opposing “justice” and “iniquity”: “The 
god Sîn who loves justice, who hates iniquity”.16 The same occurrence is 
attested with the Akkadian equivalents râmu "to love" and zêru "to hate": 
“Hate evil, love justice!”17 
"Love" appears in affective contexts in the literature between gods, es-
pecially in the Love Songs for the Sacred Marriage ritual.18 In a late cele-
bration, the Akkadian râmu is attested with words for affection, tenderness 
and sexual attractiveness such as dâdu / dâdū “beloved one, dear”, inbu 
“fruit” also “sexual fullness”, kuzbu “seduction, attraction, sensuality”, 
ṣīḫtu “laugh”. The word for "love" in Akkadian seems to have changed 
from a juridical meaning to a more emotional one. 
The Sumerian word arḫuš, like its Akkadian equivalent rêmu (a word 
that has nothing to do with râmu "to love"), is used to refer to an emotion 
close to what in English might be termed our "compassion". In Sumerian 
and in Akkadian the word also means “womb”. The semantic relationship 
between "compassion" and “womb”, even if it is found elsewhere in the 
ancient Near East, is not self-evident.19 It is true that in modern culture the 
                                                     
14  See Barth 1909: 3f. and Wehr 51985: 441. 
15  Šulgi D 13: Šul-gi dNin-lil2-la2 ki aĝ2 ša3-ga-na.  
16  Lugalbanda and Ḫurrum 215-216: dSîn-e niĝ2-si-sa2-e ki aĝ2 niĝ2-erim2-e ḫul gig. 
17  BE 1/1 no. 83 rev. 24: lemutta zērma kitta rām. 
18  The Sumerian Sacred Marriage ritual is partially known from its description in the hymn 
of Iddin-Dagan and Inanna, see Römer 1965: 128-208. During the Isin dynasty and 
probably before, the probably very ancient ritual included sexual intercourse between 
the king and a priestess representing the goddess Inanna. In the 1st millennium, the mar-
riage was celebrated between the gods represented by their cult statues and no longer by 
human actors. The best known example is the marriage between the gods Marduk and 
Ṣarpānītu in Babylon, see Lapinskivi 2004 with numerous references. 
19  See Stoebe 1976: 761-768. 
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“womb” is a metaphor for maternal protection, love, and pity, but the lin-
guistic derivation from a substantive referring to a concretely defined unit 
(“a substance of constant quality”)20 to a verb describing an emotion is an 
aspect that should be clarified.  
"Compassion" is often used in divine epithets, mostly in apposition with 
the name of a goddess rather than of a god. It also appears in parallel con-
struction with words for “prayer”: “Mother of the land, who has compas-
sion, who loves veneration, who listens to prayer”.21 It is thus the gods who 
one asks for "compassion", which is often linked with appeasing divine 
anger and the topic of the “return” of the god “to his (previous) place” (ki-
bi-šè gi4), which means to his normal, positive mood toward humans. The 
compassion of the gods, once granted, is indicated by words and gestures of 
help and renewed recognition. The movement in the emotion is always 
from above to below, that is, a god always gives compassion to someone of 
an inferior standing. As a divine quality or divine favour, "compassion" can 
only be the expression of an elite. 
2.2. Principle of justice, domination, and the emotions of "anger" and 
"hate" 
"Anger" is well attested in the Mesopotamian corpus. In the Old Assyrian 
letters, the large number of expressions of anger, irritation or reproach is 
striking. The expression of such emotion is mostly judged negatively: “Alt-
hough we never made you angry, as for you – we have become non-
gentlemen in your eyes”.22 Some essential features of "gentlemanly behav-
iour" imply living up to norms of a social code that include self-control and 
politeness.23 It is very important not to cause anger, worry, or distress to 
friends or relatives. 
Not to anger the gods is a topic of mythological and religious texts. The 
god’s anger is communicated through divine omens or signs that are more 
than a warning, the germ of unhappiness already infecting the person and 
their environment with negative energy. The gods demonstrate their anger 
through a specific attitude: he “turns his face away” (igi niĝin = pānī 
suḫḫuru) and looks with an “evil eye” (igi ḫul = īnu lemuttu) also called 
                                                     
20  See Mounin 1974, 325. 
21  Sîn-iddinam to Nininsina 9: ama kalam-ma arḫuš šud3-de3 ki aĝ2 a-r[a-zu-e ĝiš tu]ku (cf. 
Hallo 1976: 209-224). 
22  TC 3, 1:23-27: matīma libbaka ula nulammin attā ana lā awīlī ina ēnīka šaknāni. 
23  The topic of self-control is found especially in letters: “Be a man! Do not let yourself 
loose to drink!” This controlled behaviour is also expected from princes: “It is with the 
servants that you began spending more than what you had and wasting! Come on, don’t 
be a baby! They only come to see you for..., for leading you astray, for the ale-house and 
the music-hall!” (ARM 1, 28 = Durand 1997, 16 no.2:11-13 and 15-19). For a study of 
the critique made by soldiers of city life as too soft and effeminate, see Lion 2003: 17f. 
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“eye of death” (igi uš2). The evil eye can kill humans, and even gods when 
sent by a rival god. This is well illustrated by a passage in the myth of De-
scent of Inanna to the Netherworld, where Inanna, angered by the behavior 
of her lover Dumuzi, who has been indifferent to the news of her death, 
decides to hand him over to bad demons: “She (= Inanna) looked at him 
(= Dumuzi), it was the look of death (igi uš2). She spoke to him; it was the 
speech of anger. She shouted to him, it was the shout of heavy guilt: ‘How 
much longer? Take him away!’ Holy Inanna gave Dumuzi the shepherd 
into their hands (= of the demons)”.24 
The person who perceives this anger has the possibility to divert its neg-
ative effects by making a namburbi ritual (literally “its dissolving [proce-
dure]”). If the negative effects are already present, it can remove the effects 
by means of penitential prayers and rituals like the eršaḫuĝa (“lament to 
soothe the heart (of the god)”) or the diĝiršadaba (“incantation to change 
the angry heart of the god”). The end of the divine anger is signified by the 
“return of the god to his previous place” (ki-bi-še3 gi4) and by his “looking 
with a joyful eye” (igi ḫul2 bar). 
"Anger" can be justifiable when it is directed against enemies who en-
danger not only the nation but the whole cultural achievement. It represents 
morality and legitimate domination.  
The technical term for "hate" is ḫul gig. This word appears in our corpus 
in strict opposition to ki aĝ2, "to love", as a literary means to reinforce their 
opposition: “A loving heart is something that maintains the household, a 
hating heart is something that destroys the household”.25 
The Sumerian language uses two more verbs for hostility: gu2 du3 and 
gu2 bar. These verbs, composed with gu2, “back of the neck”, belong to 
physiognomic language; they are a description of a hostile attitude perhaps 
borrowed from the animal world (bristled fur). This hostility is mostly at-
tributed to the enemy.26 It is found in concrete, warlike contexts in royal 
                                                     
24  Inanna’s Descent to the Netherworld 354-358: igi mu-un-ši-in-bar igi uš2-a-ka, inim i-
ne-ne inim lipiš gig-ga, gu3 i-ne-de2 gu3 nam-tag-tag-ga, en3-še3 tum3-mu-an-ze2-en, ku3 
dInanna-ke4 su8-ba dDumu-zi-da šu-ne-ne-a in-na-šum2. 
25  SP Coll. 11.147-148 = InstrŠur. 207-208: 
 Abū Salabīkh version: ša3 ki aĝ2 niĝ2 e2 du3-du3 ša3 ḫu!(RI) gig niĝ2 e2 gul-gul  
 Old-Babylonian version: ša3 ki aĝ2 niĝ2 e2 du3-du3-u3-dam ša3 ḫul gig niĝ2 e2 gul-gul-
lu-dam (cf. Alster, vol. 1, 1997: 196). 
26  Enemies are described as barbarians who were deprived of any social code of behaviour, 
like in the Curse of Agade 155-156:  
 Gu-ti-umki uĝ3 keš2-da nu-zu, dim2-ma lu2-ulu3 ĝalga ur-e uktin / ugu2ugu4-bi 
 “The Gutians, an unbridled people, (are) of human appearance, (but) with canine rules 
and monkey’s features”. 
 As Pongratz-Leisten (2001: 195) points out “the thought-process standing behind con-
structing the image of the Other is to be characterized as a systematic thought-process of 
inversion”. She explains that the processes of de-humanization and demonization of the 
enemy enable members of a cultural group to “trivializ[e] killing inhibitions” (ibid., 208, 
227). 
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inscriptions of the Old Babylonian period: “The ones who were hostile 
against you, we shall strike them” (Akk. “We shall strike your enemies”).27 
Like "anger", ḫul gig is an ambivalent emotion in Sumerian discourse: 
when opposed to ki aĝ2 it is clearly negative, but when employed alone it is 
close to a justified anger, a legitimate hatred of a negative object (or focus) 
(it can be interpreted as “X judges Y hateful”). This is not the case for gu2 
du3 and gu2 bar, which are never employed in a moral judgement.  
The three Sumerian verbs (ḫul gig, gu2 du3, and gu2 bar) are translated 
by a single verb (zêru) in Akkadian. This difference between the concep-
tion of "hate" in Sumerian and Akkadian discourse on emotion reflects a 
cultural disagreement. zêru can describe a negative attitude and a legitimate 
negative moral judgement. In the latter sense it can appear in legal texts 
where for Meir Malul (1988: 113) it represents an act of rejection that leads 
to the dissolving of a contractual relationship.  
The Sumerian word for "jealousy" (ninim) is astonishingly rare in the 
literature.28 How can we understand that such a common emotion in mod-
ern culture as “jealousy” is attested only three times in Sumerian literature? 
One explanation should perhaps be sought in the cuneiform sign that we 
read ninim, which is a combination of the signs ŠA3 “heart” and IZI “fire” 
𒊲. This visual combination of “heart” + “fire” is reminiscent of another 
sign combination, KA “mouth” and IZI “fire” 𒅺, which writes the word 
for "anger", urgu2. In both cases, the emotion appears as a fire, burning 
respectively the heart or the mouth. The sign is thus like an illustration of 
the emotion. The cuneiform signs and many other pieces of evidence, such 
as lexical entries, tend to show a semantic relationship between "jealousy" 
and words for "anger". Thus, the distinction between "jealousy" and "an-
ger" does not correspond to today’s criteria: in fact these two notions be-
long to the same Sumerian category, that of "anger". 
2.3. Reaction facing danger and loss: the emotions of "sadness", "trouble", 
and "fear" 
The Sumerian and Akkadian languages are noteworthy for their lack of a 
specific word for "sadness". All that we find in their vocabularies are words 
describing manifestations of sadness, such as er2 “tears”, er2 šeš2/še8-še8 “to 
cry, to sob” (literally “to anoint with water-eye” as a description of the very 
act of shedding tears), a-nir “desolation”, i-si-iš “tears, lamentation, com-
plaint” and metaphorical expressions mixing expression of sadness and 
                                                     
27  Samsuiluna 7:19''-20'' (Akk. 73): lu2 gu2 mu-e-da-ab-du3-uš-a saĝ ĝiš ba-ab-ra-ra-an-de3-
en = zā‛irīka ninâr (cf. Frayne 1990: 386). 
28  See Civil 1990: 44-45. 
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words referring to rituals of lamentation (er2(-)a-ni-ra = ina bikīti u tānīḫi 
“in the tears and the desolation” is an expression referring to the lamenta-
tions in general, and er2 alone corresponds in Akkadian to taqribtum “com-
plaint of supplication” (“Bittklage”) and to pišertu  “rite of delivery” (from 
pašārum). balaĝ-a-nir-ra “the harps of desolation” and gi-er2-ra “the reed of 
tears” are musical instruments used in rituals of lamentation. What does the 
absence of a generic word for "sadness" mean? It would be ethnocentric to 
assert that ancient Mesopotamians really experienced a basic emotion "sad-
ness" but that they used different words to express it on different occasions, 
suggesting that they did not or could not generalize by giving it a single 
label the way English speakers do. All that the texts contain are facial and 
bodily expressions of sadness. Whatever might constitute an “emotional 
universal” would need to be identified in cultural terms valid for the Meso-
potamian context, not in terms of the English lexicon of emotion.29 
A first observation of the contexts where an expression of "sadness" ap-
pears can perhaps explain the absence of a category. In letters, it is not right 
to burden one’s correspondent with litanies of personal problems: “Your 
transgressions are many, and therefore worry for you is eating me up!”30 By 
contrast, litanies describing distress are characteristic of penitential prayers 
to gods. It was mostly seen as better to use an elliptical phrasing like the 
Old Assyrian standard phrase: lā libbi ilimma, “against the will of the god”, 
or more vaguely “unfortunately, sadly”. 
The semantic field covered by one word can be different from one cul-
ture to another: ša3 kuš2-u3 is a good example of a practically untranslatable 
emotion concept, rendered by Akkadian writers with malāku “to counsel” 
but clearly not equivalent to Akkadian word, still less to any English word. 
ša3 kuš2-u3 means literally “to put a strain on the heart”; it appears in con-
text of love; it is also the emotion of someone listening to music or writing 
a tablet. These usages suggest that the Sumerian word describes a kind of 
thrill, a vibration more than a “counsel”. This difference in usage of emo-
tion words is connected in some way with cultural attitudes and cultural 
identity.  
Two more words, niĝ2-me-ĝar and mud5-me-ĝar, rendered in Akkadian 
by "silence (of death)" (qūlu later also kūru), are negatively perceived. 
They never mean "quietness", which is sought by the gods in the myths of 
Atram-ḫasis or Gilgameš, but are associated with death, unhappiness, and 
prostration. Demons appear to be identified with this type of silence or can 
be the cause of it. But like many other Sumerian words, the context of this 
                                                     
29  Harkins and Wierzbicka (2001: 8) emphasize that “We cannot treat English emotion 
words such as anger as neutral, self-explanatory, and culture-independent terms by 
means of which human emotional experience in all cultures can be validly and meaning-
fully described”. 
30  Lewy, KTS 15:7-8: šillātuka mādāma u pirdātuka ētaklāni. 
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type of silence is ambivalent31 since it seems also to evoke "joy", or at least 
sometimes a positive emotion or quality: “Inanna, who like a bull gores the 
disobedient, joy(?) of the land”.32 
Many Sumerian and Akkadian emotion words are ambiguous and re-
mote from our modern conceptions. To work on understanding emotion 
words involves studying the communication in its social context, a position 
between the individual and the social world (“a culturally constituted 
self”33). Emotion concepts emerge as a kind of language of the self, a code 
about intentions, actions, and social relations. They need interpretation and 
“translation” to be communicated to others in different cultures and histori-
cal periods. 
3. Emotion as Grand Type34 
Another direction in the study of emotions is the search for points of con-
tact between these disparate elements: How can we find connections be-
tween such different concepts as "love", "hate", "trouble", "despair", "joy", 
etc., in the absence of any generic category given by the Mesopotamian 
themselves? 
We have to make a transfer from the observation of semantic data to the 
complex network of grammatical, syntactic, and stylistic constructions, that 
is, the “meta-level of the evaluation of the written construction of social 
reality”.35 The terms for emotion are submitted to the multiple word choice 
of pressure and inertia, to the dialectic proper to languages, constantly 
shaped by the tradition of communication. The second step here is induc-
tive and comparative. It is the comparison of diverse grammatical elements 
and syntactical forms that allows us not only to measure variations but also 
to catch a glimpse of the invariants of the whole. We can then make a rela-
tively autonomous abstract framework of this set, other than semantic, and 
                                                     
31  Ambivalence in emotion is not incoherence, as each culture employs a set of words or 
expressions for ambivalent emotions that cannot be rendered by a single term in another 
language.  
32  Išme-Dagan AB:6: nu-še-ga am-gin7 si-mul di mud5-me-ĝar kalam-ma. 
33  Cf. Lutz/White 1986: 417. 
34  Nissenbaum (1985: iii) subdivides the word “emotion” in “types” and “instances”: 
1) “emotion” is a grand type when it is used without plural form like the word “color”; 
2) anger and joy are emotion’s types. They are subtypes of the grand type and have a 
plural form; 3) individual having emotions at locations are instances. It is the concrete 
situation of a subject having an emotion.  
35  Cf. Pongratz-Leisten 2001: 216. Harkins and Wierzbicka (2001: 17) argue that “it is not 
only the lexicon that provides clues to the emotional universe of culture. Grammar does 
it too”. For example, they indicate that active verbs like rejoice have disappeared from 
modern English usage, giving way to passive adjectives like happy or pleased. 
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it is on this framework that we can define new categories, morpho-syntactic 
ones this time, and functions. 
In considering the problem on the basis of a new but still general 
framework, we have to introduce a reservation with regard to theories 
based on the constructions established with only one or two verbs of emo-
tion, not because they are wrong, but because we have to consider them 
with the help of a larger number of examples. The Sumerian verbs form a 
separate field because of the prefix chain that summarizes the grammatical 
structure of the sentence. The prefix chain is extremely complex but very 
interesting, particularly among agglutinating languages like Sumerian.36 
Scholars have long proposed that most Sumerian verbs of emotion had a 
comitative ({da}) construction, the comitative indicating that the verb has a 
relationship with its object.37 
Ean. 1 v 1-538 
e2-an-na-tum2, a ša3-ga šu du11-ga, dnin-ĝir2-su-ka-da, dnin-ĝir2-su, mu-da-ḫul2 
“Ninĝirsu rejoiced over Eannatum, the seed placed in the lap of Ninĝirsu”. 
It is obvious that this assertion has to be differently qualified when applied 
on a larger scale. Verbs as common as "to love" and "to hate" for example, 
are conjugated with dative or directive infixes and/or a suffix following 
their object.39 Most of the verbs expressing "fear", except perhaps ḫu-luḫ 
“to start, to be suddenly afraid”, have a terminative ({ši}) rection express-
ing a direction toward its object. This could indicate that it does not belong 
to the strict category of emotion words. 
Some verbs with the comitative rection, however, appear also in the ab-
solutive state (unmarked construction) that gives them a factitive sense. 
More explicitly, in a comitative construction ḫul2, for example, means 
“I rejoice about someone” (mu-un-da-ḫul2-en [intransitive construction]), 
but in the absolutive unmarked state, it has the sense “I make someone 
happy” (mu-un-ḫúl-en [transitive construction]). In such sentences, the 
emotion is expressed by a transitive verb, followed by a grammatical direct 
                                                     
36  For a recent Sumerian grammar in English, see Jagersma 2011. 
37  Not all emotions have objects, for example the substantive arḫuš (= rēmu) "compassion, 
pity" is used to describe a positive quality of goddesses more than an emotion. Nissen-
baum (1985: 84) argues that “predicates involving intransitive verbs often constitute 
cases of non-relational predicates. (...) They assert states of their subject (...)”. 
38  Cf. Steible 1982, vol. 1: 123. 
39  These Sumerian verbs distinguish in their conjugation between a personal and a non-
personal object. When the object of "to love", for example, is a human, the construction 
is dative ({ra}), while when the object is the city or an ex-voto, the construction is di-
rective ({e}). This type of conjugation is characteristic of Sumerian composed verbs, cf. 
Attinger 1993: 233, 239.  
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object. These are similar to sentences with transitive verbs that describe 
actions.40 
What follows from these descriptions is that the construction of verbs 
with the comitative ({da}) seems to describe an internal emotion (“to feel 
oneself about X”) whereas the construction with dative/directive and with 
terminative would characterize an action toward an object (“to (re)act emo-
tionally toward X”). The grammar of Sumerian verbs of emotion shows at 
least two categories of constructions that could be called both internal and 
active.  
The construction of Akkadian verbs of emotion is simpler: it reflects in 
part the construction of the corresponding Sumerian verbs (ḫadû "to re-
joice" is intransitive in the basic stem, but is transitive in the D stem, a stem 
that express factitive function: muḫaddi libbi dIštar “the one who rejoices 
the heart of Ištar”). Verbs like râmu "to love" and zêru "to hate" are transi-
tive in the basic stem (ummašu irammušu attī jâti ul taramminni “his moth-
er loves him, but you do not love me”) and other stems from these two 
verbs are very rarely attested. These verbs are, as Kouwenberg (2010: 56f.) 
calls them, “fientive verbs with a stative meaning”. 
3.1. Syntactic rules of valency 
It is on the morpho-syntactic level that we explore the relationships be-
tween the constituents of the sentence in the discourse on emotion with 
particular attention turned to the variations. As Lemaréchal41 says, “syntax 
and semantics are linked because syntax imposes categorizations on reality. 
The syntax contributes to the communicating significance”.42 It is the nature 
of the constituents that largely determines the structure of a proposition. 
This structure implies a subject or an agent and, in this case, a reference to 
an object. As a judgement made about reality, the emotion leads to action 
or inertia, but the cause of the action or inertia can be either the subject or 
the object of emotion.43 
                                                     
40  Kenny (1963, 2nd ed. 2003: 138ff.) distinguish between “intensional” and “noninten-
sional” verbs, “the aim being a distinction that will include all psychological verbs under 
the heading “intensional” and all other under the heading “nonintensional”. Nissenbaum 
(1985: 24) disagrees with Kenny who “wants to avoid having to treat emotion verbs like 
action verbs and, likewise, their objects. 
41  See Lemaréchal 1989: 14. 
42  Also Sahlins 1981: 6f.: Circumstances “have no existence or effect in culture except as 
they are interpreted. And interpretation is, after all, classification within a given cate-
gory.” 
43  Nissenbaum (1985: i) describes and discusses three main theories about “emotion’s 
object directedness”: 1) An object-directed emotion is related to a real concrete item; 2) 
An object arises out of the emotional (or intentional) state alone; 3) An object contains 
the cause or the explanation of the emotion.  
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The analysis proceeds along two fully developed lines. One line treats 
the relationships between the subjects and the objects in sentences with a 
verb of emotion, for example: nārū muḫaddû libbi ilāni “The musicians 
who make the hearts of the gods rejoice”.44 The other line deals with the 
nature of verbs in a proposition containing one or many words of emotion, 
for example: lugal-bi dNin-ĝir2-su ḫul2-la tum2-mu-da “To bring joy to their 
lord Ningirsu”.45 The role of the object of an emotion in a sentence touches 
on the linguistic problem of valency and actancy.46 As Nissenbaum explains 
in her book on “focus”,47 the role of the object is mostly causal: “A simple 
theory based on this form of the condition is one that requires the object of 
the emotion to be the cause of the subject’s having the emotion” (1985: 6). 
3.2. Stylistic aspects 
One of the principal characteristics of the vocabulary of emotion in Sume-
rian is the presence of the word ša3 “heart”. The Mesopotamian conception 
of the world and the person is broadly binary, in that there is an inside (ša3 
= libbu)48 and an outside (bar = kabattu “liver”).49 The heart, in the concep-
tion of the self, is the seat of emotion and the centre of thought. The mor-
phological relationship of ša3 to the noun or the verb varies. It can be, for 
example, an “endocentric extension”, to use the terminology of Martinet.50 
An endocentric extension does not add information about the intrinsic fea-
tures of the subject’s state but imparts an emphatic sense to the noun or 
                                                     
44  YOS 1, 45 ii 29. 
45  Gudea Cyl. B ix 20. 
46  Lazard 1994. 
47  See Nissenbaum 1985; also Bamberg (1997: 309): “someone does something that causes 
someone else to become angry”. 
48  Beside ša3 “heart”, Sumerian also uses ni2(-te) and me(-te) to speak about oneself as in a 
mirror. Other words that complete this picture are ur5, which refers to lungs (often em-
ployed in parallel with ša3), and lipiš, another word meaning more or less “heart”. The 
Akkadian vocabulary is less rich in this respect than the Sumerian: it uses ramānu to de-
scribe oneself; libbu “heart” is mostly employed in expressions of emotion. 
49  The Akkadian kabattu “liver” is not a translation of Sumerian bar “outside, periphery”. 
The Sumerian opposition ša3 / bar corresponds to the Akkadian libbu / kabattu; and it is 
logically artificial, indeed wrong, to make the equation ša3 = libbu and bar = kabattu. 
50  By endocentric extension, I understand everything that adds something to a concept 
without changing its syntactic function. For example, the adjective “big” in the sentence 
“He is a man with a big heart” is an endocentric extension because it only modifies the 
word “heart” (one can say “He is a man with heart”). In the same sentence, one cannot 
replace “big heart” with “sick” (to say “He is a man with a sick heart” has no sense). 
“Sick” in this case is an exocentric extension in relationship with “heart”, because it re-
quires a transformation of the sentence’s structure (“This man has a sick heart”), see 
Martinet 1960: 131f. 
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verb.51 For example, ša3 gig lipiš gig (corresponding to Akkadian libbu with 
marāṣu “to be ill, sick”), which expresses sadness and trouble, ša3 ḫul (lib-
bu with lemēnu “to be bad”), ša3 dab(5)-ba, ša3 ib2-ba, ša3 mer-ra for anger, 
irritation and an expression only attested in Akkadian: libbu with parādum 
“to tremble, to be afraid”. Among positive emotions, ša3 ḫul2 (libbu with ḫadû) “to enjoy”, ša3 ḫuĝ (with nâḫu “to calm, to soothe”), etc. The Akka-
dian idiom combining libbu with nasāḫu “to tear out” is an expression of 
despair. In Old Assyrian letters, the common idiom lā libbi ilimma means 
litterally “against (the heart =) the will of the god” or more vaguely “sadly, 
unfortunately”. 
Other stylistic particularities are typical of certain periods, like the di-
verse formulas that are found almost exclusively in a corpus of inscriptions 
of the Old Babylonian king Warad-Sîn of Larsa. These repetitive expres-
sions make it possible to analyze similarities and variations in the grammat-
ical construction of the sentence: 
Warad-Sîn 3:35-36 
niĝ2-AK-ba-še3 dNergal diĝir-ra-na ḫe2-en-ši-ḫul2 
“May Nergal his god rejoice for what has been done!” 
Warad-Sîn 10:40-42 
niĝ2-AK-ba-še3 dNanna lugal-ĝu10 ḫe2-ma-ḫul2-e 
“May Nanna my king rejoice over me for what has been done!” 
Warad-Sîn 11:14-15 (transitive marû): 
niĝ2-AK-ĝu10-še3 ḫe2-mu-ḫul2-e 
“(Inanna) rejoices indeed over me for what I have done”.52 
Also typical of certain texts is the repetition of terms in parallel sentences 
characteristic of liturgies:  
Eršaḫunĝa to Anu 14-1653 
ša3 mer-a-zu  ki-bi-še3 de3-ra-ab-gi4-gi4 
ša3 ib2-ba-zu   ki-bi-še3 de3-ra-ab-gi4-gi4 
ša3 ib2 si-ga-a-zu  ki-bi-še3 de3-ra-ab-gi4-gi4 
                                                     
51  There are many ways to express emphasis in the Mesopotamian languages: for example 
the use of the reflexive pronoun ni2-te = ramānu to emphasize the subject of the sen-
tence, or the independent personal pronouns in Akkadian or modal clauses with the pre-
fix ši- in Sumerian used to express an emphatic assertion; cf. Jagersma 2010: 578f.  
52  Frayne 1990: 207, 216, 218. Warad-Sîn developed a very personal style with new for-
mulas in his inscriptions. The three fixed expressions found almost only there show 
grammatical variations from the standard construction of ḫul2 with the comitative: In 
Warad-Sîn 3, the conjugation of ḫul2 is intransitive with a terminative infix {ši}; in 
Warad-Sîn 10, ḫul2 is intransitive and contains the infix dative 1st. Pers. Sg. {ma}; in 
Warad-Sîn 11, the conjugation is transitive and mu-ē = me is an absolutive construc-
tion. 
53  Cf. Maul 1988: 75.  
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“May your angry heart turn back to its (former) place!  
May your furious heart turn back to its (former) place!  
May the fury of your darkened heart turn back to its (former) place!” 
It is also typical that in letters from angry senders sentences such as “you 
are my father, you are my lord” are repeated several times. Letters also 
contain oaths sworn by the gods and rhetorical questions.54 
Such constructions are well known in Arabic and in Akkadian but are 
much more difficult to find in Sumerian. Style in Sumerian texts, already 
tackled by Attinger in his grammar (1993: 315-318), would merit further 
development. 
Emotion words reflect, and pass on cultural models, and these models, 
in turn, reflect and pass on values, that is, preoccupations and frames of 
reference for the society (or speech community) within which they have 
evolved. In studies of the vocabulary of values (good/bad), and of words 
describing oneself (ni2(-te)/me(-te) = ramānu), metaphors and stylistic con-
structions are secondary to the analysis of the discourse on emotion, but 
they do raise significant interesting issues. The lexicon of words for values, 
of description of oneself and metaphors, is quite similar on the whole to the 
process observed for the words of emotion. Information gathered with a 
view to these perspectives may serve as an element of comparison with the 
lexicon of emotion words. They give researchers who are focused on “pure-
ly emotional vocabulary” access to a vocabulary that does not fit in the 
same frame but touches it closely. 
4. Conclusion 
The designation “discourse on emotion” derives from critical and theo-
retical analysis of material mainly present in Sumerian, Akkadian, and bi-
lingual literature. The texts show that a vocabulary of emotion existed in 
the languages of Mesopotamia. What are the implications of this conclu-
sion? Starting from elementary questions concerning translation that can be 
misleading as well as instructive, I have tried to understand which ideas the 
languages of Mesopotamia conveyed with a specific terminology. The path 
to discover this cultural phenomenon is difficult as one has to be careful not 
to oversimplify the picture of a cultural environment that did not corre-
spond to a modern one. The dangers that one can hardly avoid are, follow-
ing Lutz (1988: 218), of three sorts: we interpret emotion as identical to 
                                                     
54   Such analyses exist in other fields. Müller (1993) studies the phraseology and stylistic 
techniques in classical Arabic, attempting to formulate in abstract terms the repetitive 
expressions containing either a verb of emotion or all kinds of verbs – these latter being 
summarized under the heading “to do”; compare also the review of Ullmann 1995: 214-
216. 
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ours, we see them as radically opposed to ours, or we understand them as 
less numerous and less intense compared to modern emotional normality. 
The intensity of an expression of emotion can vary depending on social 
codes, as has been shown for example by Briggs (1970) and others. Emo-
tions are judgements that require social validation or negotiation to be rea- 
lized, thereby linking emotion with social structure.55 They are closely 
linked to the culture in which they are expressed, but they are not a homo-
geneous class. They can also change in the history of one cultural group, as 
Harkins and Wierzbicka have illustrated in the shift in the Shakespearian 
"wrath" to the modern "anger" which reflects the democratization of a soci-
ety and the overturning of the feudal order. Because emotions are embed-
ded in socially constructed categories, the “truth” of emotions (as of all 
subjective entities) is problematic.56 
Emotional experience is almost endlessly mediated through language. It 
is not possible to give a complete meaning list of the emotion words of the 
Mesopotamians as we are constrained by the available texts. We can only 
try to understand how and with which terms they expressed emotions, 
showing in which contexts and with which syntactic constructions they em-
ployed them. We must accept the assumption that the structure of sentences 
describing emotions reflects the structure of the world and, in particular, 
“emotion’s object-directedness”. Rather than “re-constructing” emotions, 
the historian must “de-construct” all the expressions incorporated into the 
very particular matrix of emotions in written texts and make a chart of all 
words found in the sources. Such an approach has the advantage of consid-
ering not the person who feels, but rather the discourse on emotion itself. 
To approach this discourse as an object of study is to address a cultural 
feature, and it allows a certain distance with respect to that object.  
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Zu diesem Buch 
Die historische Emotionsforschung ist ein wichtiges interdisziplinäres 
Forschungsfeld. Nicht zuletzt die Auseinandersetzungen mit Fragen um 
biologisch fundierte Universalien und soziokulturell bedingte Partikula-
rität und Relativität spielen dabei eine Rolle. Konzeptuelle Inkongruen-
zen zwischen heutigen Begriffen von Emotion und den Emotionskon-
zeptionen der Antike machen deutlich, dass Gefühle eine Geschichte 
haben und doch grundsätzlich zum Menschsein als solchem gehören. 
Das Medium Bild eröffnet andere Möglichkeiten transkultureller Unter-
suchung als das Medium Sprache. Es kann deshalb einen wichtigen Bei-
trag leisten, um besser zu verstehen, wie im Alten Orient mit Emotionen 
umgegangen wurde: Werden auf Bildern aus Mesopotamien, der Levan-
te und Ägypten in Gestik, Körperhaltung, Gesichtsausdruck etc. Emotio-
nen wiedergegeben, und wenn ja, wie? Welche Bedeutung und welchen 
Stellenwert hat die Wiedergabe von Emotionen in der visuellen Kommu-
nikation? 
Die Beiträge im ersten Teil des Bandes gehen anhand von ausgewählten 
Beispielen der Frage nach, ob und wie in der altorientalischen Kunst 
Emotionen dargestellt werden. Die Lösungsansätze sind kontrovers: Der 
These, es handle sich in keinem Fall um eine Visualisierung von Emotio-
nen, sondern um kulturelle Rollen beziehungsweise rituelle Inszenie-
rungen, steht die Annahme gegenüber, dass sich hinter nonverbalen 
Ausdrucksformen durchaus Emotionen verbergen und lediglich das spe-
zifische Methodenrepertoire gesucht werden muss, um die bildlichen 
Darstellungen angemessen zu deuten. 
Der zweite Teil des Bandes enthält fünf theoretische Reflexionen aus 
komparatistischer, linguistischer und kunsthistorischer Perspektive. Mit 
dieser breit angelegten interdisziplinären Diskussion – Assyriologie, 
Ägyptologie, Archäologie und alttestamentlicher Wissenschaft – bietet 
der Sammelband, der aus einem Workshop anlässlich der 61. Rencontre 
Assyriologique Internationale in Bern und Genf im Juni 2015 hervorge-
gangen ist, einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Forschungspositionen 
zu diesem wichtigen Thema. 
About this book 
The history of emotion is an important interdisciplinary research field, 
not least because it touches fundamental questions about the distinction 
between psychobiology-based universals and socio-cultural, path-de-
pendent and thus relative peculiarities. Conceptual incongruities between 
what is today understood as emotion and various views on emotions in 
antiquity should not distract from the fact that, while emotions do have a 
history, they substantially belong to all human experience as such. 
Visual media and images open perspectives for transcultural research 
that differ from the testimony of texts. Their study can thus make a major 
contribution to a better understanding of emotions in the Ancient Near 
East. How where gestures, body postures, facial expressions etc. visual-
ized in images from Mesopotamia, the Levant and Egypt and what role 
does the visualization play in communicating emotions? 
The first part of the present volume takes concrete examples as a starting 
point and discusses the fundamental question whether or not emotions 
were represented and can thus be studied in Ancient Near Eastern art. 
Approaches and arguments are controversial: Some authors argue that 
there are no visualizations of emotions, but only of cultural roles and 
ritual embodiments. Their view is contrasted by other contributors, who 
assume that one may detect non-verbal expressions hiding emotions in 
visual respresentations and that it is crucial to specify the appropriate 
tools and methodologies to interpret them in an adequate way.  
The second part offers five additional theoretical reflexions from com-
parative, linguistic and art-historical perspectives. With such a broad in-
terdisciplinary approach including Assyriology, Egyptology, Near Eastern 
archaeology and Hebrew Bible/Old Testament studies, the volume offers 
a large panorama of the most important research positions on a funda-
mental topic.
The book results from workshop discussions held in June 2015 during 
the 61st Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale at Bern and Geneva. 
Contributors include John Baines, Dominik Bonatz, Izak Cornelius, Mar-
garet Jaques, Othmar Keel, Sara Kipfer, Florian Lippke, Silvia Schroer, An-
dreas Wagner, Elisabeth Wagner-Durand, and Wolfgang Zwickel.
